![[Park Seung-jun, Editorial Writer]](https://contents-cdn.viewus.co.kr/image/2026/04/CP-2023-0070/image-c55fbab6-3b06-418c-8ed3-005a1c3088ed.png)
On the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s website, the diplomatic relationship between China and Iran is traced back to the 2nd century BCE. “Friendly exchanges between China and Iran began when Ban Chao, a Han general in the 2nd century BCE, sent deputy envoy Gan Ying to Iran — then called the Anxi kingdom — to open a route to Rome.”
Modern diplomatic ties were established in August 1971. In 2016, President Xi Jinping visited Iran and the two countries forged a “comprehensive strategic partnership.” In 2024, bilateral trade totaled $13.37 billion, with China posting an $8.93 billion trade surplus.
The Economist warned on March 17 that, despite China’s renewables capacity and sizable oil reserves, it cannot avoid an energy shock. Citing China’s National Bureau of Statistics, the magazine noted that China meets roughly half of its energy needs with coal from thick seams in Shanxi, Shaanxi and Inner Mongolia and supplements that supply with nuclear, solar and wind power. Still, about 18% of China’s energy needs are met by oil, and roughly 13–14% of that oil must be imported from the Middle East.
Chinese customs data show the top 10 crude exporters to China in 2024 were, in order: Russia, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Malaysia, Oman, the UAE, Brazil, Angola, Kuwait and Qatar. Russia supplies China via two main pipelines: one that runs through Alashankou (阿拉山口) in the far west to Lanzhou (蘭州), and another that crosses the middle reaches of Heilongjiang (黑龍江) in the northeast to Tianjin (天津). China nonetheless imports most of the LNG it uses for urban heating — in 2023, 97.8% came from countries such as the U.S., Australia, Qatar, Russia and Malaysia.
The Iran war began Feb. 28 with preemptive strikes by the United States and Israel. On March 30, Foreign Affairs published an essay by Zongyuan (Zoe) Liu of the Council on Foreign Relations titled “What the Iran War Means for China.” Liu argues that Beijing worries less about U.S. military strength than about U.S. unpredictability. Foreign Affairs added that, after Donald Trump returned to the White House in 2025, the United States undermined the order it had helped sustain, wielded power in ways that unsettled markets and allies, and damaged international confidence. While that trend might appear to benefit China, Chinese leaders believe their country’s rise still depends on a functioning global economy and stable international order — the very order the U.S. historically supported.
Chinese leaders view the U.S.–Iran conflict differently from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. They see it as a threat to China’s core strategic interests because it increases instability in the United States and thereby weakens the international order that China depends on. Beijing’s greater fear is not simply Washington’s loss of power but that a directionless world might prompt the United States to misuse whatever power it still retains. Foreign Affairs likened the situation to a line from the Song-era Shishuo Xinyu: “A single beam cannot support a great hall,” meaning that when a large structure collapses, even strong timber cannot hold it up. Chinese leaders worry that if the U.S. stops reliably sustaining the order and then wields its remaining strength erratically, China cannot be secure.
One major change since the U.S.–Iran war began concerns the perceived likelihood of a 2027 Chinese invasion of Taiwan. The Economist reported on March 18 that a newly released U.S. intelligence annual report said Chinese leaders now claim their military does not plan to invade Taiwan in 2027. If accurate, that contradicts years of U.S. assessments that President Xi had set a 2027 deadline for a potential attack, and it undermines expectations that the Iran war would increase the likelihood of a Chinese assault on Taiwan.
NBC reported on March 10, 2021, that then-U.S. Indo-Pacific Commander Admiral Philip Davidson told the Senate Xi had set a 2027 deadline for an attack on Taiwan and that the threat could materialize within six years. Many U.S. officials and think tanks treated Davidson’s assessment as credible. But The Economist quoted Eli Ratner, a former Pentagon Asia official in the Biden administration, saying the Iran war is unlikely to raise the odds of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.
If the Iran war drags on or produces an unstable peace, Xi could gain breathing space. He could study the combat experience from Ukraine, Venezuela and Iran to accelerate PLA reforms or refine amphibious surprise-attack tactics against Taiwan. The Economist, citing Charles Wu of National Chengchi University, noted that Xi likely observed Iran’s tactic of blockading the Strait of Hormuz and may prefer a strategy of surrounding Taiwan and probing U.S. responses rather than launching an immediate surprise assault.
The Economist also argued that the Iran war has had positive effects on China’s economy. The Chinese government had stocked up four months’ worth of oil during the conflict, yet on March 23 it surprised citizens by raising gasoline prices 13%. The war pushed up the producer price index, which had fallen for 41 consecutive months, and boosted global demand for China’s top three exports: electric vehicles, lithium-ion batteries and solar panels. Those trends could prompt Beijing to revise upward the growth target it set at the National People’s Congress government work report on March 5 — a target of 4.5–5.0%, the lowest since 1991.
Chinese leaders have learned a paradox from the Iran war: they long hoped for a weakened, less capable United States, but they now see that an unstable or unpredictable America does not automatically benefit China. A declining U.S. does not necessarily make China stronger; it can make China more vulnerable. Chinese officials say they hope U.S. policymakers will understand that “everything that weakens America does not necessarily strengthen China.”
World Bank data show that at the end of 2024 Iran’s population was about 91.56 million, its GDP $475.25 billion, and GDP per capita $5,190. Iran’s population is roughly 9.2 times Israel’s 9.9744 million, but Iran’s GDP trails Israel’s $540.38 billion, and Iran’s per-capita GDP is about one-tenth of Israel’s $54,177. The United States has roughly 340 million people, a GDP of $3.4011 trillion, and GDP per capita of $84,534. That economically stronger states such as the U.S. and Israel would combine to attack a far weaker Iran is a tragic dynamic; given Iran’s economic disadvantages, its ability to endure is uncertain. We must watch whether the postwar international order leaves China confronting a more volatile, unpredictable America, as Chinese leaders fear.
About the author
▷Graduated Seoul National University, Department of Chinese Language and Literature ▷Ph.D. in International Politics, Korea University ▷First Beijing correspondent for the Chosun Ilbo ▷Visiting professor, Department of Chinese Language and Culture, Incheon National University ▷Advisor, Choi Jong-hyun Academic Foundation ▷Editorial writer, Aju Business Daily
